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background: This article reports on an investigation of the views of IVF couples asked to donate fresh embryos for research and
contributes to the debates on: the acceptability of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, the moral status of the human embryo
and embryo donation for research.
methods: A hypothesis-generating design was followed. All IVF couples in one UK clinic who were asked to donate embryos in 1 year
were contacted 6 weeks after their pregnancy result. Forty four in-depth interviews were conducted.
results: Interviewees were preoccupied with IVF treatment and the request to donate was a secondary consideration. They used a
complex and dynamic system of embryo classiﬁcation. Initially, all embryos were important but then their focus shifted to those that had
most potential to produce a baby. At that point, ‘other’ embryos were less important though they later realise that they did not know
what happened to them. Guessing that these embryos went to research, interviewees preferred not to contemplate what that might
entail. The embryos that caused interviewees most concern were good quality embryos that might have produced a baby but went to
research instead. ‘The’ embryo, the morally laden, but abstract, entity, did not play a central role in their decision-making.
conclusions: This study, despite missing those who refuse to donate embryos, suggests that debates on embryo donation for hESC
research should include the views of embryo donors and should consider the social, as well as the moral, status of the human embryo.
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Introduction
There has been much debate on the moral status of the human
embryo (Beyleveld, 2008; McLean, 2008) and on the acceptability of
deriving stem cells from human embryos, since this results in the
destruction of those embryos (McLaren, 2001; ASRM Ethics Commit-
tee, 2002; de Wert and Mummery, 2003). We aim to add new con-
siderations to these debates by presenting data from a study
investigating the views, values and experiences of couples undergoing
IVF, who were asked to donate [We are following current conventions
by using the language of ‘donation’. However, there is a strong case for
using the more neutral language of ‘provision’ (Haimes, 2008).] fresh
embryos for human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research.
Our central research question was ‘What is the repertoire of per-
ceptions, concerns and views considered by couples who have been
asked to donate their embryos for research, as part of the process
of deciding whether to donate?’. This study builds on an earlier inves-
tigation in the same clinic which indicated broad patterns of donor
characteristics (Choudhary et al., 2004). However, that study did
not talk directly to the IVF patients about their reasons for donating.
The study reported here addresses that gap. (The clinic assisted with
access to patients for our social science study, but we followed pre-
vious patterns of collaboration in ensuring full ethical and analytical
independence from the clinical team.)
Even though IVF patients might be assumed to attach particular
value to embryos, since they have strived so hard to acquire them,
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embryo donation (Haimes and Luce, 2006). Knowledge about their
views and experiences contributes to debates about whether it is ethi-
cally justiﬁable to ask them to donate embryos: in particular, to donate
fresh embryos during their IVF treatment. It is important for policy-
makers, researchers and practitioners to know whether the potential
practical gains from hESC research are achieved at social and ethical
costs to embryo donors and, if so, what those costs might be.
Equally, evidence of good practice in embryo donation needs to be
identiﬁed so that it might be replicated elsewhere.
Methods
This research was conducted in one UK clinic. Since little was known
about patients’ experiences of the request for fresh embryos, a
hypothesis-generating, rather than testing, design (based on inductive prin-
ciples) was followed. We sampled for maximum variation of ideas and per-
ceptions (i.e. heterogeneity sampling, a subcategory of purposive
sampling), with the aim of recruiting sufﬁcient numbers to allow thematic
saturation to be reached (Silverman 2001, pp. 250–254). All couples
undergoing IVF treatment over 10 months in 2005–2006, who were
asked to donate embryos for a range of studies, were contacted 6
weeks after receiving their pregnancy result, to request their participation
in a social science interview. A total of 399 requests were made leading to
46 consent forms agreeing to participate being returned to the authors
and, because one couple changed their minds and one couple could not
ﬁnd a suitable time, 44 interviews were conducted; the response rate
was 11%. Reasons for non-participation were impossible to judge directly
as the authors only had contact with potential participants after they had
completed a consent form; this recruitment system was adopted to
protect patient conﬁdentiality. A semi-structured interview format was
used enabling interviewees to: (i) shape the discussion in ways relevant
to their experience; (ii) express views in their own words and thus
attach a variety of meanings to what is superﬁcially the ‘same’ experience
or entity; (iii) broaden the scope of the research by raising topics not pre-
viously considered; and (iv) challenge others’ assumptions. Broad sets of
questions covered the following areas: interviewees’ demographic
details; how they ﬁrst heard about donating embryos and how they
made their decisions; their views of the consent processes; their under-
standings and views of stem cell research; any previous knowledge or
involvement in embryo experimentation; their knowledge of regulation
of fertility treatment and hESC science; and their wider awareness of
social and ethical issues in this area. All interviews were fully transcribed.
Through the hermeneutic analysis of transcripts, using constant compari-
son and category building procedures, major themes in interviewees’
views were identiﬁed. This was followed by category mapping and
deviant case analysis, to allow inductive theorising (Silverman, 2001).
Results
There were 30 couples who had had either one (14 couples) or two
(16 couples) cycles of treatment; 13 couples who had had three or
more cycles; and 1 couple was unsure how many cycles they had
had. Of the 44 couples, 27 reported that they thought they had con-
sented to donate fresh embryos to all the hESC research projects in all
their cycles of treatment; another 3 couples consented to donate to all
projects though not in all their cycles; 2 couples declined to consent to
donate embryos to any of the studies; another 10 couples consented
to donate to some though not all studies; and 2 couples were unsure if
they had consented to donate embryos.
Five major themes emerged: (i) interviewees’ views on embryos; (ii)
why and how they made the decision to donate or to refuse; (iii) their
evaluations of the consent process; (iv) their understandings of the
research projects they were being asked to donate to; and ﬁnally, as
a cross-cutting theme, (v) the socio-medical context of IVF in which
they were asked to donate their embryos. This article focuses on
the ﬁrst theme.
Analysis of interviewees’ views on embryos revealed ﬁve interwo-
ven subthemes: (i) the experiential lens of IVF through which they
viewed the request to donate ‘spare’ fresh embryos, given their goal
of having a baby; (ii) their deliberations over whether the embryo is
the same as a baby; (iii) their concerns over the number and quality
of eggs and embryos that they produced through IVF and the
options for how to use these; (We have termed these considerations
the ‘calculus of conception’ to reﬂect the persistent mental arithmetic
that couples have to perform when calculating the possible combi-
nations of outcomes of treatment.) (iv) their views on the opportunity
to see the embryos selected for transfer, on a screen, prior to trans-
fer; and (v) how they spoke about, and compared, the transferred and
non-transferred (n-t) embryos.
The ﬁrst and second subthemes acted as primary reference points
throughout the interviews and framed almost everything else intervie-
wees said; we therefore draw attention to this framing here. We have
labelled this feature of their discourse ‘baby talk’ (Haimes et al., 2008).
Though not unexpected, this framing needs to be made explicit, given
(i) the beneﬁts of hearing from potential donors themselves about
their priorities, and (ii) concerns over the difﬁculty of acquiring
embryos (and oocytes) for hESC and other research. Since we delib-
erately did not ask interviewees directly about associations between
embryos and babies, the fact that ‘baby talk’ emerged spontaneously
is a testimony to its strength in framing the interviewees’ views. Inter-
viewees saw themselves, ﬁrst and foremost, as ‘IVF patients’ not
‘embryo donors’.
In the description of the ﬁndings that follows, we argue that insight
into how and why decisions are made, and the impact of those
decisions, can assist the identiﬁcation of ethically robust ways of
improving donation rates, if IVF donation continues to be seen as an
appropriate way to source such tissue. However, the highlighting of
patients’ priorities should not be taken as another reference to the
desperate state of IVF patients who are seen as being so focused on
babies that they are deemed incapable of making rational observations
and choices beyond that of IVF itself (Franklin, 1990). Rather it is a
reminder that from their point of view, the research is just another
consideration (of many) encountered on the way to achieving their
goal. This might also explain the uncertainty about which studies
they agreed to donate to, in which cycle of treatment. That which is
vitally important to researchers, regulators and some clinicians (the
acquisition of embryos for hESC research) is (initially at least) of
only secondary importance to the IVF patients. This point was made
explicitly by at least 10 couples.
Each subtheme sheds light on how interviewees speak and think
about, and act towards, ‘the embryo’ and shows just how complex
and variable these understandings of the embryo are in the IVF
clinic, at the interface of IVF treatment and hESC research (Franklin,
2006; Svendsen and Koch, 2008).
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The following brief extracts provide evidence of where the intervie-
wees’ focus lay. As one interviewee said, ‘the sole purpose’ is ‘to
have a baby ...they’re not here to be part of a medical experiment,
they’re here because they want a baby...obviously you’re not just
thinking about the research, you’re thinking about the whole
concept of the treatment that you’re going to start and what that’s
going to mean to your life ...[In IVF] you’re consciously thinking,
“I’m going to have to have all these injections...”, so I think you
have a lot more on your mind that’s probably distracting you away
from the paperwork that says “this research we’re going to do will
be looking at this and that”. So some people might just think, “that
really doesn’t involve me personally, I’ll sign that and then think
about the consequences afterwards”’ (IVF16:430–551). Interviewees
apologetically referred to their ‘selﬁshness’ or ‘greed’. Several said
they were happy to donate to research as long as they had ﬁrst selec-
tion of the embryos and only those not useable for their treatment
went to research. Whilst it would be ‘wonderful’ to cure Parkinson’s,
‘really our priority is just to have a baby’ (IVF28:1005–1029). These
views are summed up by one interviewee, ‘IVF ...is such a big thing
anyway, especially if it’s your ﬁrst time. [Research is] not really your
priority. It sounds selﬁsh but that’s the way people think ...To
be honest I don’t think I read the third set of information’
(IVF35:493–532).
Embryos and babies
In the IVF context, the association between embryos and babies is not
unexpected. However, the data below show that they were not seen
by interviewees as simplistic equivalents.
Therefore ‘baby talk’ is not meant to suggest that interviewees
thought embryos were babies; rather, ‘baby talk’ framed patients’
deliberations, being the initial and most prominent reference point
from which other distinctions developed.
One woman said: ‘...I think in a way an embryo is still a baby. I still
think of it as a baby right from day one’. However, the embryo they
donated for research was ‘unused material, stuff that can’t be put
back in us for whatever reason, ‘cos they don’t think it’s good
enough’ (IVF4:885–990). Thus, the ﬁrst device she employs to
explain her views is to draw a comparison between embryos and
babies but equally, and at the same time, embryos can be ‘stuff’.
Two broad clusters of views emerged from the interviews. The ﬁrst
cluster considers the possibility that the embryo is a baby or could be
regarded as a baby, actually or in its immediate potential. One couple
described their ﬁrst reaction at being asked to donate embryos as ‘we
didn’t want anybody to have our babies [laughs], our embryos’
(IVF35:229–232). The second cluster encapsulates assertions that
the embryo is clearly not a baby and is ‘just a ball of cells’
(IVF5:215–228), ‘a blob’ (IVF12:312–349), ‘it’s this tiny little dot’
(IVF17:627–639). However, these interviewees then debated
whether the embryo, if not a baby, is nonetheless a living entity. ‘At
what point does a blob, or speck of cells, divided cells, become a
person? Or when does it become capable of thought?’
(IVF39:1144–1231).
These two positions do not represent hard and fast groupings to
which interviewees could be easily allocated, however; rather, they
were clusters of considerations which they voiced as they, for the
most part, struggled to reach a settled view. For example, one inter-
viewee asserted that the embryo is not a baby but expressed the
ambivalence and discipline that need to accompany this stance:
‘You’ve just got to get past the fact that [pause] and not think of
the egg and the embryo in terms of a child. You’ve got to still think
of it as an egg and an embryo, which is what in fact it is...Unless
it’s planted inside the womb it’s never going to develop into a child
and I think you’ve got to basically remember that it’s still an embryo
and an egg’ (IVF7:573–580). These data indicate how interviewees
oriented themselves towards the request and towards the ‘entity’
they were asked to donate.
The ‘calculus of conception’
We use this phrase to convey the mental arithmetic that patients end-
lessly perform to calculate their chances of achieving a baby from the
number of follicles, eggs, fertilised eggs, cells and embryos they have
succeeded in producing. The calculations gain complexity by consider-
ations of quality [‘it’s drummed into you, it’s quality, not quantity that
counts’ (IVF40:833–852)] and by the choices between different uses
of these entities. The request to donate embryos complicated these
calculations for interviewees.
Interviewees knew that embryos could be: (i) transferred back to
the woman; (ii) frozen (though this clinic has a longstanding policy,
which predates involvement with hESC research, of caution towards
freezing embryos, due to concerns that it gives couples false hopes
about future outcomes, given the likely deterioration on thawing,
and also because of the expense of freezing. The clinic only freezes
embryos if there are four or more good quality ones left after
embryo transfer); (iii) donated to other couples for treatment
(though only 1 of the 44 couples interviewed had agreed to donate
eggs for the treatment of others; the rest were all less keen on this,
from fear that this could result in someone else having ‘their’ baby);
(iv) donated for research; or (v) disposed of without further use.
However, interviewees reported a disparity in what they wanted to
do and what actually happened: almost all would have preferred a
combination of transferring two embryos and freezing the rest (to alle-
viate, ﬁnancially, physically, emotionally, as they saw it, the next cycle
of IVF). They remained puzzled, at the time of interview, that they
themselves turned out not to meet the dual quantity–quality criteria
(especially those who had produced a large number of eggs or
embryos). Reactions ranged in intensity. One woman sounded
resigned to the fact that she had produced ‘quite a lot of eggs’ but
only four good embryos (IVF7:185–221). Another though was
‘shocked’ that having produced 26 eggs, 17 of which had fertilised,
she had no embryos available for freezing: ‘that was quite a smack
in the face’ (IVF2:186–228).
This type of disappointment is not unusual in IVF, but some inter-
viewees questioned whether these results were related to the
research context (see below). They also remained unclear about
how the judgement had been made about what to do with the
embryos. There was some uncertainty about how the quality of
embryos was judged and how this grading affected decisions about
freezing or use in research. Again, many (at least 15 couples) said
that they were not told much or anything at this stage and this had
left them puzzled. They were unclear whether embryos not good
enough for transfer or freezing were still good enough for research.
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that it would be ones unsuitable to be transferred that would be
used, they would never use perfect ones [for research] ...Fourteen
fertilized, so we were really, really optimistic ...when it came to
embryo transfer they said they were going to transfer two and I said,
"were there any to be frozen for another cycle for us?" and they said,
"no", and that was the only answer we got. So I don’t know whether
that was below the four because I believe it’s got be four perfect
ones, then they’ll go ahead and freeze them...But they said there
was none to be frozen. So maybe there were one or two perfect
ones used for research that they couldn’t use in the freezing process.
I’ve no idea’. It is important to add that this person immediately said,
‘I understood at the time that things would happen that way and I
understood fully’ (IVF1:439–482). However, she is clearly indicating
that there was ambiguity in what was said or in how she understood it.
Those expressing uncertainty also said they felt reluctant to ask for
further information, though it is not clear what inhibited them
(especially in light of other remarks about the high quality of service
provided by the clinic). It might have been that at the time they
were so focused on the transferred embryos that they did not con-
sider these other aspects until later (see below). This is a further indi-
cation that the IVF process is so consuming of attention and energies
that many aspects of the decisions taken did not occur to patients until
after the cycle had been completed.
Seeing embryos prior to transfer
Patients are routinely given the opportunity to see the embryos about
to be transferred back to the woman, on a screen beforehand. The
majority of couples (34 cases) took this opportunity and found it posi-
tive and exciting. Many (19 cases) spoke about the shape and number
of cells and their sense that at long last something was happening (17
cases). However, the experience encouraged interviewees to associ-
ate the seen embryos with possible future children in stronger
terms than previously and this led to mixed emotions.
One woman described how her views of the embryo, and ideas
around life itself, were affected by the experience: ‘I think I’ve
become far more fascinated by it ...when you see ﬁve cells on a
screen, that’s quite a strange sensation...I’ve suddenly got a lot
more respect for how hardy life is. I always imagined before we
started the treatment that the eggs and embryos were far more deli-
cate than I now think they are...I feel unlucky that I’ve had to go
through the treatment but I also [feel] very privileged that I’ve poten-
tially, I’ve seen my child at ﬁve cells which most people just don’t get
the chance to do’ (IVF11:653–697).
At least nine couples decided they did not want to see the embryos
in any cycle and two said they would not look on another cycle. The
decision though is not easy: ‘...the second time my husband wanted
to see them again and I refused so I had to cover my eyes...I felt that
because I’d looked at them I’d developed a relationship [starts crying]
and the second time I just thought, "well, I won’t look at them and
then I won’t think about them", but you do [long pause] Sorry, it’s
dragging up loads of memories [crying] ...But even though you
haven’t seen the rest of your embryos I still feel like I’ve lost, you
know, however many babies ...’ (IVF23:590–633).
For another couple, though, the failure to sustain a pregnancy was
not a reason for not seeing the embryos in the next cycle: ‘we still
really wanted to see them...you’ve got to think its going to work,
you [would] want to have seen them at that stage. But I do think it
makes it harder’ (IVF40:1092–1106). Once again the imagined child
is evident: if the treatment had worked, they would have regretted
not seeing the child at that early stage.
Of those who were pregnant, one couple said they wished they had
taken a photograph, ‘so we could say to our child, "this was you when
you were four cells" [all laugh]’ (IVF1:833–877). Another couple
referred to their child from a previous cycle when they had also
seen the embryos, ‘we saw her, we don’t know which one was her
at this early stage ...she was being naughty then!’ (IVF22:550–561).
They imbue the embryos with the child’s biography and attributes
from this point. Those who were not pregnant tended to have the
same conversation with the hypothetical child as those above were
having with the actual child, ‘you do think that one day it would be
a nice story if you got pregnant to say to your child, "I’ve seen you
when you were just four cells big"’ (IVF20:723–750).
As we have seen, it was in anticipation of a sense of loss that some
couples chose not to see the embryos. However, even those who did
not feel the loss as a miscarriage nonetheless used the same frame of
reference: ‘they put them back in and then I think it’s ten days later
you come and get a blood test to see whether they’ve taken and
they hadn’t, obviously. But I never thought that I’d lost two babies’
(IVF6:377–396). Once again the association between embryos and
babies is such that these are the terms in which claims that
‘embryos-are-not-babies’ have to be explained.
Within the context of having agreed to donate to research, the
relationship to a projected child could be troubling, on later reﬂection.
Seeing the embryo on the screen, ‘turns it into a little person...which
is ﬁne, but when you’re talking about consenting for stem cells [laughs]
and then, you’re seeing these embryos and you can see the cells jig-
gling around, you think, "well...". But by that time you’ve ﬁlled the
forms in, but of course you remember that for the next time’
(IVF9:1026–1037).
Comparing the transferred and n-t embryos
Given the impact of seeing (or deciding not to see) the embryos that
were to be transferred, it is fruitful to compare interviewees’ views on
these embryos with the non-transferred (n-t) embryos ones. This pro-
vides insight into their views on embryos in general (do all embryos
have the same social and moral value, whatever their usage or
destiny?) and insight into how they view the embryos that they have
donated for research (do these have a different social or moral
value, given their particular destiny or presumed lesser quality?). The
data suggest that interviewees had little chance to make such compari-
sons during the IVF process but that later reﬂection raised further
questions for them.
Uncertainty over destiny of n-t embryos
Interviewees were asked whether they knew what had happened to
the embryos that were not transferred. Since most interviewees had
few or no embryos frozen, this discussion tended to centre around
their knowledge about the other possible destinies for the embryos.
Almost all 42 couples who consented to donate to research were
unsure whether this had been acted on or even if the embryos
were good enough for research. Several described being too
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transfer to think about the other embryos at that time: ‘I can’t remem-
ber whether anybody said to me they were good enough to be used
or not, or whether I asked, because at the time, I was just, "wow,
what’s going on?" ...I didn’t stop and think, it wasn’t high on my list
of priorities. But if they were used then that doesn’t worry me’
(IVF6:415–440).
Did they compare transferred and n-t embryos?
Further aspects of interviewees’ views of the relationship between
transferred and n-t embryos became apparent when they were
asked directly whether they compared the two, and if so, how. One
woman said, ‘I just feel a sense of loss...I think at the time it’s enor-
mous, but now I don’t try to think about that. That’s probably why
you get upset when you do start to talk about it. But I think you’d
go mad if you did think about eleven babies that you could possibly
have had and you haven’t got one. And so it’s scary...’W h e na s k e d
how she thought about that loss in relation to the decision to donate
she replied, ‘it’s a case of, "if I can’t have them then nobody else is
going to have them", to give to other couples, but in terms of research
then if they’re no good to me then hopefully they might be good in
some other sense. So that’s how I rationalise it’ (IVF23:720–739).
This theme of ‘trying not to think’ is not uncommon, though expressed
in different ways at different points in the interviews. Another woman
said, ‘I didn’t think about the ones that weren’t transferred at all
[long pause]. I think I possibly did the ﬁrst cycle, I think I did and so I
purposely don’t any more [laughs]...I think it gets a little bit easier
with each cycle...’ (IVF15:580–603). Again there is a sense of a
struggle between how much these experiences actually mean and
how much they ought to mean, and uncertainty about whether they
are being given too great or too little signiﬁcance.
How were embryos selected?
Consideration of the n-t embryos entailed reﬂection on how embryos
were selected.
Some were happy with the decision-making process: ‘That was the
thing that wasmade clearatthe start. They would only use for research
what couldn’t viably be used for us. So I never ever attached myself to
the other ones ...at no point did we say, "Oh I wonder if any of the
others could have [worked]". We always knew that the two best
ones went in and the rest just weren’t suitable’ (IVF29:702–43). This
group of, approximately eight, interviewees were not particularly con-
cerned either about the destiny of their n-t embryos (beyond their dis-
appointment that not more were frozen) or what happened to them
once they got there. They were preoccupied with their treatment
and they had little detailed understanding of the physical or social
context of the research to which they were donating.
Others questioned how the clinic picked the ones to be transferred:
‘she said that they would only pick the ones that are grade one but if
there are nine grade ones, I did wonder how did they choose this one
and not the other one...I wish I’d had them all ...for me life starts at
conception so I still felt that was life really, even if they weren’t going
to be implanted’. Her partner commented, ‘you just have to trust that
they’re experienced and they know which ones have a better chance
...I do think life starts at conception but at the same time if you trans-
fer all nine of them then most will not survive anyway, you’re better off
implanting the ones that are going to survive’ (IVF32:539–609).
Another woman said, ‘they’ve probably thrown some good ones
away, you don’t know’ (IVF35:1901–1922).
The troubling third embryo
This possibility was particularly troubling for a signiﬁcant subset of inter-
viewees who hadmore thantwotopqualityembryosbutnotenoughto
have any frozen in this clinic. We refer to these as the ‘troubling third
embryo’ (which is a shorthand as some couples could have one, two
or three top quality embryos that are neither transferred nor frozen
so this phrase includes the ‘troubling fourth and ﬁfth embryo’ too).
This is where the difﬁculty of satisfying quality and quantity criteria
affects couples most. There is far less acceptance or resignation about
these embryos than for the other n-t embryos discussed so far. At
least 11 couples who were clear that they had at least one top quality
embryo that was neither transferred nor frozen struggled with this.
One woman who thought she had good quality embryos that were
not transferred said she had produced ‘six really good quality and we
had two go back’, so ‘the four, they were the leftovers weren’t they.
They’ll have had some really good poke abouts at them. They’ll have
dug all sorts [out] of them if they were good quality ones...well, I
signed the form, I signed the form, that was [my] decision to make
[short pause]. But it’s the good ones that upset me, the four little
good ones’ (IVF18:1718–1741). Another said about the third embryo
that could not be frozen, ‘I would like to know what other people
think, people who are getting more because you can’t help thinking at
the back of your mind, "hmm, that might be my one chance of having
a baby and I’ve given it away for this research"’ (IVF6.2:351–96).
Another, less sanguine, woman described how her understanding of
this possibility emerged as she went through treatment and then
reﬂected afterwards. Referring to the early stages of the IVF process
she said, ‘...at that stage it all seemed fairly straight forward to me.
The only time I found it much harder was when there was a fertilised
egg that they couldn’t freeze, and that’s when I thought, I wasn’t happy
with it at that stage...that possibility had not occurred to me-that
you’d have a viable embryo that they would not freeze ...that
wasn’t covered particularly well and that’s the bit afterwards I said
to [partner] that I didn’t feel happy with that particular situation
because that theoretically was just as viable as the ones they put in’.
She later said, ‘I’d never thought of that possibility...I didn’t know
how I was going to feel about anything to be honest, and it was all
very, very new...I was prepared for every other step of not getting
enough eggs, or not getting any fertilised eggs, but I wasn’t actually
prepared for that step of having to throw one away’. She reﬂected
on how much harder the situation would have been if she had not
got pregnant. Later she made her point more strongly: ‘I felt differently
about donating the viable embryo...because the way I felt it had
been worded was, or how I understood it, was all the viable ones
would be frozen and I’d obviously not understood that that might
not happen. The non-viable embryos that weren’t suitable for freezing
and the eggs that didn’t fertilise, I had no problems with, but as I say,
the viable embryo, yes I did’. She returned to this later in the inter-
view, ‘I don’t think I had really appreciated the emotional aspect of
[long pause] the emotional aspect of, wasting my own eggs, if you
see what I mean? That, that was a loss ...’ (IVF14:130–591). It is inter-
esting to note that this couple were pregnant at the time of the inter-
view so IVF had worked for them: pregnancy though did not eliminate
the difﬁculties experienced with this process.
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about the n-t embryos that ‘might have worked’. Here, they are com-
paring one, two or three embryos that had at least as good a chance of
working as those that were actually transferred. The already-
challenging IVF process acquires an additional difﬁculty when patients
realise that such good quality embryos might have gone to research
instead, especially for those who would rather not dwell on what
that research entails (see below).
Treatment or research?
This led at least nine couples to question whether research was more
important to the clinic than treatment (ﬁve of whom also expressed
concerns about their troubling third embryos). Couples in this group
said they felt that the research agenda was ever present, in the
clinic and in the local and national media. One man said, ‘They
explained everything about the treatment until they were happy that
we understood what we were doing, then introduced this secondary
part of it ...about any products [embryos] that we give them, that
can’t be used for us, would we be happy and so on, it was always
at the end of whatever we wanted to speak about...they had
another agenda from what we had, but [we weren’t in dispute] with
one another. It was done well. It was done professional. In fact, out
of all the hospitals and things like that that I deal with, they’re easily
the most professional that I’ve ever seen’ (IVF19:1452–1470).
Others were less positive: ‘Obviously the treatment you get is fan-
tastic but I do believe, and I may be very, very, wrong on this, but I do
believe that the [Senior Clinician] is very much into research and I
think IVF [short pause] is a sideline for them. I don’t think it’s their pri-
ority. I may be wrong ...’ (IVF28:160–172). Another said, ‘Unfortu-
nately it gives me the impression that the research was the priority
and the IVF was just like the bread and butter part of it to fund the
research. That’s how I felt. And still do...So when I didn’t get told
about what happened to my embryos and my eggs, or your sperm,
you do think, "were you just wanting to keep it for your research
because is that the priority?" And I get a little bit annoyed when I
talk about it’ (IVF9:228–273).
The suggestion that embryos were kept back for research could be
considered a serious allegation although such comments were usually
made hesitantly or apologetically, accompanied by acknowledgements
of the importance of research in general. Interviewees spoke of being
reassured when they had raised such questions with clinic staff and
also of there being ‘proper procedures’, but doubts still lingered.
One couple decided that they would not consent to the research
during their next cycle, wondering if their chances would be better:
‘not thinking that anything untoward was going on but we thought
that if the option isn’t there to use those embryos for research they
might then decide they can be frozen. For all that they told us that
that wasn’t going to be possible, in our minds we wanted to give our-
selves the best chance. We weren’t saying that anything would happen
but you do hear about these things that you just never think of that
went on, years ago they’re pinching baby parts and keeping them in
jars ...I mean that’s pretty serious stuff ...So we just wanted to
give ourselves the best chance’ (IVF43:892–966).
Knowledge about research
Those who assumed that their embryos had been used for research
had little grasp of what that might entail. Some (eight couples) were
not concerned since they regarded these embryos as ‘my throw
away bits...it wouldn’t upset me to think that somebody in a lab
may be messing about and doing experiments with my throwaways,
no, it really doesn’t bother me’ (IVF6.2:545–571). There was some
hesitation in referring to embryos as waste material: one couple
appeared to correct each other: he said, ‘I just got the impression
that it was anything that was left over, wasn’t it –’, at which point
his partner interrupted to say, ‘anything that was left’ and he
resumed with, ‘anything that was left was going to be used, yeah’
(IVF36:581–592), as if the notion of ‘leftovers’ was not appropriate.
Others, however, were uncertain about how much they wanted to
know about the research, with some expressing quite strong discom-
fort about what had happened to the embryos. One woman said, ‘It’s
just enough to know that you’ve left your egg or embryo and hopefully
it will help, but I wouldn’t want to know what was done to it ...that
would be what I’ve given to help people but I wouldn’t want to know
what was done to it’ (IVF7:347–363). Another said, ‘You’d like to
know if it was worth it, if there was some value taken out of them’
but ‘...I wouldn’t want to know exactly what they did with them
...’. When asked what she was hesitant about, the woman replied,
‘I can’t put my ﬁnger on it ...[short pause] because it’s still part of
you, isn’t it ...you wouldn’t want to know speciﬁcally, would you?’
(IVF38:392–457).
Discussion
Brieﬂy summarising the above material, we can see that the intervie-
wees are preoccupied with IVF treatment and the request (and in
most part the agreement) to donate is very much a secondary con-
sideration. Addressing the central research question, it is clear that
interviewees’ views of the embryo are complex and dynamic, changing
over the different stages of IVF. The calculus of conception means that
initially all embryos are important but as measures of quantity and then
quality emerge, they learn to focus their energies on those that have
most potential to produce a baby. At that point, the other embryos
are less important. On later reﬂection, they realise that they do not
know what happened to those other embryos and they ﬁnd them-
selves unable to articulate easily just what they think of those n-t
embryos. There is evidence that interviewees sense that the
embryos deserve special consideration (it does not ‘feel right’ to
label them ‘leftovers’) and that the research itself could involve
aspects they would rather not consider (this was said with particular
strength by a couple who had become pregnant). However, the
embryos that caused interviewees most concern were those that
held value precisely because they might have been capable of produ-
cing a baby but went to research instead: the troubling third embryos.
Their value to interviewees lay not in their inherent qualities as
embryos but as potential (to become) babies.
From this brief examination of data, we can see that interviewees
operate with a complex system of embryo classiﬁcation. First, there
are ‘embryos’ which represent the vital step of treatment without
which no baby could result and which are therefore of enormous
value. Once these are classiﬁed as apparently good or poor quality,
perceptions shift, with patients’ energies focusing on the ‘good’
embryos. The ‘other embryos’, at that stage, are not given individual
attention; they are each one among many that hold no particular indi-
vidual promise or even value—at that stage. On later reﬂection,
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the treatment itself that embryo diminishes in importance. Attention
shifts instead to ‘our embryos’: that is, those that could be seen on
the screen, that were transplanted and which might, or did, produce
a pregnancy. Sometimes ‘our embryos’ were frozen, if enough were
produced, to be used for later attempts. The distress caused by the
‘troubling third embryo’ is precisely because those good quality
embryos that went to research should really have been among ‘our
embryos’, from the interviewees’ point of view. Finally, interviewees
clearly held a version of ‘the embryo’, the morally laden, but to
them abstract, entity that they were aware was the subject of
debate and which they felt deserved respect (hence the apologetic
use of ‘leftovers’). However, this category of embryo, though not irre-
levant, did not play a dominant role in their decision-making.
Therefore, the interviewees’ views differ from those who debate
the moral status of the human embryo (from any position) since
they start from a different framework of relevance, one that is domi-
nated by the IVF context and experience. Arguments about potential-
ity and capacity can be found in their utterances (Haimes et al., 2008)
but these are embedded in their calculations of quantity and quality,
and good and bad embryos, rather than in a view of the inherent qual-
ities of embryos per se. This embryo classiﬁcation scheme suggests that
debate about the acceptability of hESC research should be broadened
beyond that of the moral status of the human embryo to encompass
also the variable social status of embryos. These data also suggest that
the moral and social status of embryo providers should be included in
deliberations.
The main weakness of this study is insufﬁcient representation of
those who completely refused to donate embryos to stem cell
research. Previous studies have found variation in the numbers refus-
ing. Bjuresten and Hovatta (2003) reported only 8% of those asked
refused, while a larger UK study found 46% refused (Choudhary
et al., 2004). Hug’s (2008) review of the literature on decision-making
about donation of embryos suggests that being at the beginning of
treatment, not understanding the purpose of research and having
good quality embryos, all inﬂuence potential donors to refuse.
However, these factors were also important to our interviewees, so
they cannot be determinative of the ﬁnal decision. We were able to
elicit the views of only two refuser couples: in both cases, they
objected to what they saw as possible animal research rather than
the treatment of the human embryo. Therefore, it is likely that the
views of those with a strong moral objection to either embryo exper-
imentation and/or stem cell research are underrepresented here.
Although it is less likely that strong opponents of embryology would
use IVF at all, it is unclear whether refusers have particular objections
to stem cell research. Other research suggests that access to ‘refu-
sers’, to elicit their reasons for non-donation, is often difﬁcult so it
might be that such people are ‘research refusers’ in general. There
are also tentative suggestions that refusers in these contexts are less
trusting of either the institutions involved in the research or the expla-
nations given for the research (Haimes and Whong-Barr, 2004;
Haimes and Williams, 2006). This, together with the ﬁndings of
Choudhary et al. (2004), may also explain the low overall response
rate in our study. The relevance of such possibilities for the embryo
provision context clearly needs further exploration.
The strengths of this study lie in its original insights into the debates
around the use of embryos for hESC research. First, this study focuses
on the provision of fresh embryos, an aspect that has received little
attention hitherto. Although there are several studies on the choices
potential donors might make with their frozen embryos (van
Voorhis et al., 1999; Leach Scully and Rehmann-Sutter, 2006; Lyerly
et al., 2006; de Lacey, 2007a, b; Fuscaldo et al., 2007; Lyerly and
Faden, 2007), few have studied the particular considerations that
arise when requests for donation to hESC research are made during
the IVF process itself. A brief report of a Swedish study of the acqui-
sition of fresh embryos for hESC research reported the ‘positive atti-
tude’ of donors (Bjuresten and Hovatta, 2003, p. 1355) though that
study had similar difﬁculties to ours in discovering why some patients
refused. Also that study, though valuable as an early investigation in
this ﬁeld, lacks an in-depth understanding of donors’ values and per-
ceptions and does not explore the impact of combining IVF with
requests to donate. Our study usefully provides both those elements.
It has been argued that the ‘intensely pressured context in which
women create eggs for IVF’ (Cohen, 2000) has such an impact that
requests for donation to research should only be made in relation
to frozen embryos (McLeod and Baylis, 2007). The American
Society for Reproductive Medicine Ethics Committee argued that ‘it
is appropriate to use only spare embryos that have been frozen’
while acknowledging that questions would arise about the possibility
of using fresh embryos because of their potentially better quality
(ASRM Ethics Committee, 2002, p. 959). However, studies on
patients’ decision-making over the range of possible fates of their
frozen embryos suggest that this raises many difﬁculties for patients
(Fuscaldo et al., 2007) and is subject to change (Newton et al.,
2007). de Lacey suggests that these problems could be resolved by
making decisions about the futures of embryos before any are
frozen. Our study contributes to her call to explore how this ‘moral
reasoning could be facilitated’ (de Lacey, 2007b, p. 1757). It is clear,
though, that requesting only frozen embryos would not resolve all dif-
ﬁculties for embryo providers.
Another valuable aspect of this study is the presentation, from the
providers’ point of view, of the complex detail in which they perceive
embryos. It is not uncommon in earlier studies to suggest that patients
think of the embryo as a child (Laruelle and Englert, 1995; Nachtigall
et al., 2005; Svendsen and Koch, 2008). However, our study adds
greater depth to such observations and shows that the conceptual
relationship between ‘embryo’ and ‘child’ is much more nuanced,
subtle and contextualised (and therefore variable) than such earlier
claims allow (de Lacey, 2007a, b).
A further contribution is the provision of in-depth empirical evi-
dence to question the oft-used adjective of ‘spare’ in relation to
embryos. Although this has been raised conceptually (Holm, 1993;
Svendsen and Koch, 2008), we now have evidence (particularly data
on ‘the troubling third embryo’) that donors’ understandings of
‘spare’ might not match that of clinicians, researchers or ethicists. Pre-
vious studies have tended to use this phrase rather loosely and vari-
ably. Evidence from our study suggests the need to have a very
explicit discussion with potential donors about what this phrase actu-
ally means in practice in any particular setting, both in relation to fresh
embryos and in relation to local freezing policies.
These new insights into the debates on the uses of embryos for
stem cell research suggest a number of conclusions and recommen-
dations, on the question of whether it is ethically justiﬁable to ask
IVF patients to donate fresh embryos. First, while requesting fresh
2148 Haimes and Taylorembryos is not without its problems, it would appear that these inter-
viewees regarded this as a reasonable request. There is some sugges-
tion in data under the theme of ‘understandings of research’ that
interviewees did not grasp all the details of the projects they were
contributing to, such as the issue of immortality of stem cell lines,
but that could be an objection raised about any request to contribute
to hESC research, not whether embryos are fresh or frozen.
However, a second conclusion is that requests for fresh embryos
should not be made in a patient’s ﬁrst cycle of IVF. Although there
were no overt objections to the research request itself, many intervie-
wees raised the issue of how stressful and busy IVF is, particularly in
the ﬁrst cycle when ‘so much is going on’ and it is all very unfamiliar
to the couple. Combining this sense of confusion and stress with
the data above on the variability of patients’ views of the embryo as
they go through the different stages of IVF suggests that patients
need to experience one full cycle, and thus experience this variability,
before they can fully appreciate what it might mean to them to provide
an embryo for research. Delaying the request until the second cycle
also improves the patients’ chances of fully understanding the different
possible deﬁnitions of ‘spare embryos’. In short, waiting until the
second cycle improves the chances of consent being more fully
informed and being based on experience as well as on counselling
and documentation (Manson and O’Neill, 2007). This delay also pro-
vides some of the distance that proponents of only asking for frozen
embryos suggest is needed to ensure patients make autonomous
decisions, while avoiding some of the additional problems associated
with decision-making over frozen embryos. Adopting such a strategy
would also be an effective response to those patients who question
the priorities of IVF clinics involved in stem cell research.
Several questions arising from this study would beneﬁt from further
consideration. For example, now that embryo donation is more wide-
spread, how do these ﬁndings from a UK clinic compare with those in
other countries? Some comparative work has already been conducted
(Leach Scully and Rehmann-Sutter, 2006; Haimes et al., 2008) and
more is being explored, e.g. in China (Mitzkat et al., 2009) and else-
where, through an international network of studies on providers’ per-
spectives. Also this and other studies very usefully establish the
importance of exploring donors’ perspectives and experiences, and
establish the importance of women’s reproductive labour in global
tissue economies (Cohen, 2000; Waldby and Cooper, 2008).
However, it remains unclear just what weight such aspects are, or
should be, given in the policy-making process in these areas.
What is clear though is that this study adds to our understanding of
the wider social implications of stem cell science. Much of the socio-
ethical material on hESC science hitherto either addresses the thera-
peutic end goals of such work or the moral status of the embryo. This
article opens up for discussion the ‘black box’ of the provision of
embryos and gives us greater insight to a key early point in the
process of hESC research, without which progress would be very
slow indeed.
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